Raj Shah Managing Editor of Desh Videsh Media Group

Editorial January 2026

Posted on: January 5, 2026 by: Deshvidesh

Dear Readers,

U.S.-India 2025: Strains, Shifts, and Modi’s Resilience

For more than two decades, India–U.S. relations have been described as one of the quiet success stories of modern geopolitics. From the suspicion and distance of the Cold War era, the two democracies steadily built a relationship anchored in shared interests—trade, technology, counterterrorism, defense cooperation, and people-to-people ties. By the early 2020s, India had emerged as a central pillar of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy, while the United States became one of India’s most important strategic partners.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 state visit to Washington symbolized this evolution. The rare sight of bipartisan applause in the U.S. Congress suggested that India had achieved something extraordinary: consensus in an otherwise deeply polarized American political environment. Many believed the partnership had matured beyond personalities and electoral cycles.

Yet the return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 fundamentally altered the tone and assumptions underpinning this relationship.

Some commentators have portrayed this phase as one in which India was pressured, sidelined, or forced to compromise. That interpretation, however, overlooks a critical reality.

Prime Minister Modi did not bow to Trump’s pressure.
Instead, India responded with strategic confidence—reasserting autonomy, diversifying partnerships, and recalibrating its global posture without abandoning engagement with Washington.

The End of Comfort—and the Beginning of Clarity

India entered Trump’s second term without hostility and without illusions. Public opinion in India remained largely favorable toward Trump, and memories of the personal rapport between Modi and Trump during the first term lingered. But New Delhi never mistook personal chemistry for structural alignment.

That distinction became painfully clear with the release of the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 2025.

As analyzed by Dr. Rahul Mishra and other strategic thinkers, the NSS signaled a sharp departure from previous American assumptions. The Indo-Pacific—once the centerpiece of U.S. strategy—was deprioritized. India, previously framed as a key partner in balancing China, was mentioned only in passing. Even more striking was Washington’s softened language toward China and Russia, suggesting an openness to accommodation rather than confrontation.

For India, the result was not merely disappointing—it was clarifying.

The premise that India’s rise was strategically indispensable to Washington was suddenly called into question. But rather than react defensively, India adjusted calmly, guided by a principle deeply embedded in its foreign policy tradition: strategic autonomy.

Tariffs, Pressure, and the Limits of Coercion

If strategic neglect unsettled New Delhi, economic coercion tested it.

The Trump administration imposed steep tariffs—some reaching 50 percent—on Indian exports, among the highest levied on any U.S. trading partner. The hardest hit sectors were textiles, seafood, and light manufacturing, which employ millions in India. These measures were not subtle; they were explicitly political.

The message was clear: reduce energy imports from Russia or face economic consequences.

India did not comply.

New Delhi continued buying Russian oil and did not accept Washington’s moral framing of India’s energy security. Instead, it responded pragmatically—absorbing short-term shocks, redirecting exports, and accelerating trade diversification toward Europe, East Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

Crucially, Trump’s maximalist pressure did not fully materialize into sustained action. Several tariff threats were delayed, diluted, or quietly rolled back as U.S. importers, consumers, and businesses began to feel the economic backlash. In practice, Trump backed down on the most extreme measures, choosing bluster over escalation.

India, meanwhile, stayed its course.

Sovereignty Is Not a Negotiating Chip

Perhaps the most diplomatically sensitive flashpoint came with Trump’s repeated public claims that he had personally de-escalated tensions between India and Pakistan during the May 2025 crisis.

For New Delhi, these statements crossed a red line.

India has been unequivocal for decades: Kashmir is a bilateral matter, and third-party mediation is unacceptable. Rather than issue ambiguous clarifications or quiet corrections, India publicly and firmly rejected Trump’s assertions.

There was no concession. No recalibration. No silence.

Trump eventually stopped repeating the claim.

In diplomacy, this episode mattered far beyond headlines. It signaled that India would not trade sovereignty for goodwill, nor would it allow external narratives—however powerful the source—to redefine its red lines.

The China Question and the Illusion of a G-2

One of the most consequential developments during Trump 2.0 has been Washington’s evolving posture toward Beijing. Across multiple analyses, a troubling pattern emerges: Trump appears increasingly intrigued by the idea of a U.S.–China “G-2”—a condominium of great powers managing global affairs through transactional bargains.

The NSS 2025 reinforces this perception by framing China primarily as an economic competitor rather than a strategic adversary. Trump’s renewed outreach to President Xi Jinping, willingness to compromise on trade, and relative neglect of the Quad have raised alarms across Asia.

For India, this shift strikes at the heart of the strategic logic that drove India–U.S. convergence over the past two decades. If Washington is prepared to accommodate China’s regional ambitions, India’s role as a balancing partner becomes secondary—regardless of its demographic, economic, or military weight.

India did not protest loudly. It adapted.

While remaining firm on border security and sovereignty, New Delhi cautiously reopened diplomatic channels with Beijing to manage tensions and avoid miscalculation. Engagement, in this context, was not appeasement—it was prudence.

Modi’s Multi-Directional Diplomacy

Contrary to narratives of isolation, India under Modi has expanded its global engagement during this period.

Russia: India maintained its long-standing strategic relationship with Moscow, rooted in defense cooperation and energy security. This was not ideological alignment but national interest—pursued transparently and unapologetically.

Middle East: Ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Egypt deepened across energy, infrastructure, technology, and regional diplomacy. India emerged as a trusted, non-intrusive partner in a volatile region.

Europe: Engagement with France, Germany, and the European Union accelerated, particularly in defense manufacturing, green energy, and advanced technology. Europe increasingly views India as a stable counterweight in a fractured global order.

Indo-Pacific Partners: Japan and Australia remain central to India’s outlook, even as U.S. enthusiasm for multilateral frameworks has wavered.

Global South: India has continued to position itself as a voice for developing nations—advocating debt relief, development financing, and equitable global governance.

This was not a drift. It was designed.

Restrictions on H-1B visas—disproportionately affecting Indian professionals and the Indian-American community—found strong political support within Trump’s base. Meanwhile, Trump’s unexpected warmth toward Pakistan, including high-level engagements and new transactional deals, underscored how dramatically U.S. South Asia policy had shifted.

India did not attempt to compete in flattery or transactional theatrics. Its democratic culture and institutional norms simply do not permit such an approach.

What Has Endured—and What Has Not

Despite turbulence, the India–U.S. relationship has not collapsed.

Defense cooperation continues. Institutional dialogues remain active. A long-term defense framework has been renewed. The completion of the Tahawwur Rana extradition process—though initiated earlier—was finalized during this period.

But trust has been eroded.

India can no longer assume U.S. support in a crisis with China. Nor can it rely on Washington as a predictable strategic anchor. These are not emotional conclusions; they are structural assessments.

A Strategic Reckoning—Handled with Poise

Faced with this reality, India has not retreated—it has recalibrated.

The tariff shock accelerated export diversification. Diplomatic hedging became more deliberate. Engagement with Washington continues, but without illusions or dependency.

Above all, India has learned a durable lesson: personal relationships between leaders are no substitute for institutional reliability.

As several analysts observe, placing excessive faith in Modi’s rapport with Trump proved unviable. But the outcome was not weakness—it was clarity.

A Test Not Just for India, but also for America

In the long run, Trump’s approach may harm the United States as much as it inconvenienced India. Alienating reliable partners while experimenting with accommodations for adversaries weakens credibility. Allies adapt; adversaries coordinate.

India will endure.

Its economic trajectory remains strong. Its demographic dividend is unmatched. Its geopolitical relevance—spanning the Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and Global South—is undeniable.

Trump 2.0 has tested India–U.S. relations, but it has also revealed something more important: India’s rise is no longer contingent on any single partnership.

Prime Minister Modi did not bow. He recalibrated.
India was not isolated. It diversified.
And where pressure was applied without respect, India stood firm—and Trump, on multiple fronts, ultimately backed down.

From bonhomie to strategic autonomy, this phase marks not a setback, but a maturation.