Raj Shah Managing Editor of Desh Videsh Media Group

Editorial November 2026

Can America Repair Trump’s Foreign Policy After the Midterms?

Donald Trump urged Republicans to vote as if his name were on the ballot. In Texas, he had backed Ken Paxton over Republican Senator John Cornyn in the primary. Democrat James Talarico beat Paxton in November. In South Carolina, Trump threw his weight behind Darline Graham, who lost to Democratic physician Annie Andrews in a state Trump had carried by nearly 18 points in 2024. Michael Whatley lost to Roy Cooper in North Carolina, and Vivek Ramaswamy lost his bid for governor of Ohio. Democrats won both chambers of Congress.

Those defeats exposed a weakness that matters beyond the Republican Party. Trump could help decide who represented the party in important races. His endorsement could do only so much once those candidates faced the wider electorate. Republican lawmakers who watched safe-looking seats fall now have their calculations to make when the White House asks them to defend another tariff increase or vote to fund a war their constituents are tired of paying for.

When the new Congress takes office in January, Democrats will control committee agendas in both chambers and decide what reaches the floor. Trump will still direct diplomacy and retain his veto. Foreign governments will need to monitor both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to determine which American commitments can withstand a conflict between them.

India Has Already Lived Through Five Reversals

Between April 2025 and October 2026, the Trump administration reversed or softened its position at least five times in tariff and Russian oil decisions that directly affected India. Some were part of wider U.S. policy shifts. Others concerned India specifically. For an Indian exporter quoting a price on goods ordered months in advance, the immediate question was how much the shipment would cost by the time it reached an American port.

The first retreat came in April 2025. Trump announced a 26 percent reciprocal tariff on Indian goods. Within days, he paused the higher rates for India and other trading partners for 90 days, leaving a 10 percent baseline tariff in place. By August, Washington had taken the confrontation in the opposite direction. A 25 percent reciprocal tariff and a separate 25 percent penalty for buying Russian oil pushed the combined rate on many Indian goods to 50 percent.

The second retreat came in February 2026. Trump lifted the additional oil tariff, and the two governments announced an interim framework specifying an 18 percent U.S. reciprocal rate. India offered concessions of its own. There was room for a serious negotiation over market access all along, and businesses on both sides had reason to welcome the announcement. By then, exporters and their American customers had spent months trying to price orders and plan investments around a 50 percent tariff.

The third reversal came on March 5. After pressing India to stop buying Russian oil, the U.S. Treasury gave Indian refiners 30 days to buy sanctioned Russian oil already loaded on ships. The war with Iran had disrupted supplies, and Washington wanted more oil on the market. The waiver served an immediate purpose. It also showed how quickly Washington could accept an argument about energy security that India had been making for months.

The fourth came in April. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on April 15 that Washington would let the Russian oil waiver stay expired. Two days later, the administration renewed it through May 16. Trump had discussed oil with Prime Minister Narendra Modi that week. Treasury subsequently let the waiver lapse on schedule.

The fifth came on October 16. Weeks after signing the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, Trump used its waiver authority to suspend measures that could have exposed Indian goods to tariffs of up to 100 percent over Russian energy purchases. The administration told Congress the waiver would help its efforts to negotiate peace between Russia and Ukraine. For New Delhi, there was an obvious question. If Washington could make an exception when it needed room to negotiate with Moscow, why had it treated India’s need to keep its fuel supply affordable as grounds for punishment?

What the New Congress Can Change for India

The midterm defeat provides Trump a reason to seek a trade agreement he can present as a win. It gives India a reason to ask how long any relief will last. As of November 10, the two governments were still working to finalize the first phase of an agreement. Recent discussions had covered customs and practical questions about how goods move across borders. That work is easily overshadowed by a presidential announcement, even though businesses depend on it to know which shipments qualify and what they will owe.

Democratic control could make it harder for Trump to impose sweeping duties without explaining their cost to American importers and consumers. Committees can call administration officials to testify and demand the analysis behind a proposed tariff. Congress can also pass legislation narrowing the trade powers it previously delegated to the president. If Trump vetoes such a bill, Democrats would need a two-thirds vote in each chamber to override him. Republican lawmakers will have to decide how far they are willing to go after watching their party lose ground in states and districts it had expected to hold.

India could face greater pressure on Russian oil, even as it finds a more receptive audience for tariffs. Congressional support for Ukraine transcends party lines, and Trump’s October sanctions relief faced criticism from both Republicans and Democrats. New York Democrat Gregory Meeks introduced bipartisan legislation to block Trump’s plan to bring Russian diesel back into the global market. Lawmakers could press for tougher enforcement against Russia while questioning tariffs that raise prices for American companies. India has an interest in making its case on both issues directly to Congress.

The War with Iran Brought Foreign Policy Home

For many voters, foreign policy arrived as a higher price at the gas pump. The conflict with Iran disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and helped drive up energy prices. In a survey conducted after the election, 71 percent of Americans said they wanted Congress to pass legislation ending the war, and 62 percent supported repealing Trump’s import tariffs. The incoming majority will have to decide how far it is prepared to go with those demands.

Congress can hold public hearings on what the administration seeks to achieve in Iran and challenge its requests for military funding. What it does matters to India, where refiners need to plan for disruptions long before Washington decides whether to issue a waiver. India has more options for purchasing from other suppliers if shipping through the Gulf becomes more reliable. If the conflict drags on, demands that India abandon cheaper Russian crude will carry a cost that officials in Washington should be prepared to discuss openly.

Will America’s Partners Trust It Again?

In June 2026, only 35 percent of Canadians described the United States as a reliable partner, down from 83 percent in 2022. A future American president could arrive at a NATO summit, get a warm reception, and promise to consult allies again. Canadian and European leaders would still have reason to ask what happens after the next election. Some defense purchases and supplier contracts made in response to American uncertainty may be in place for years.

Democrats have their disagreements to work through. Restoring old diplomatic practices would leave unresolved questions about military intervention and Washington’s uneven application of human rights principles. The election gives Congress a chance to take responsibility for decisions it has too often left to the president. Hearings on a tariff or a war should begin while lawmakers can still influence what happens, before businesses have canceled orders or military spending has committed the country to another year of fighting.

For India, the first test may come with the next dispute over a shipment of Russian oil or the next round of negotiations over American access to India’s farm market. New Delhi will observe whether a disagreement remains at the negotiating table or abruptly alters the tariff imposed on Indian exporters. How Washington handles that ordinary, difficult part of the relationship will tell India how much the midterms changed.

Raj Shah Managing Editor of Desh Videsh Media GroupRaj Shah,
Managing Editor,
Deshvidesh Media Group.